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HIS Article reviews the major cases from the United States Supreme
Court, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, and the Texas courts of
appeals in these areas of criminal procedure: pretrial (with the excep-
tion of confession, search, and seizure), trial and appeal. This Article also
reviews the major changes to the Code of Criminal Procedure in these areas
as a result of the last legislative session.
I. FORMER JEOPARDY
In a significant step backward for double jeopardy jurisprudence, the
Supreme Court, in United States v. Dixon,' overruled the recent case of
Grady v. Corbin.2
Dixon combined the appeals in two cases that arose out of nonsummary
criminal contempt proceedings. In both cases a court issued an order forbid-
ding a person to engage in criminal conduct. In one case the court incorpo-
rated the entire criminal code and in the other the court forbade the
commission of assault. Both persons violated the court orders and were later
found in contempt. Subsequently, both persons were criminally prosecuted.
One person was successful in having his criminal prosecution dismissed on
double jeopardy grounds. The other was not successful. The government
appealed the dismissal of the first and the contemnor appealed the failure to
dismiss the other case.
The initial question for the Supreme Court in Dixon was whether the pro-
tections of the double jeopardy clause3 apply in nonsummary criminal con-
tempt prosecutions just as they do in other criminal prosecutions; the
Supreme Court held that they do apply. 4 The more difficult question for the
court was whether the subsequent criminal prosecutions were barred by the
double jeopardy clause.
Prior to Grady v. Corbin a subsequent prosecution was barred by the
double jeopardy clause unless each offense contained an element not con-
*B.A., J.D., The University of Texas, Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
SB.A., The University of Texas; J.D., Southern Methodist University, Attorney at
Law, Dallas, Texas.
1. 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
2. 495 U.S. 508 (1990).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4. 113 S. Ct. at 2856.
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tained in the other offense.5 Grady held that a subsequent prosecution was
also barred "if, to establish an essential element of an offense charged in that
prosecution, the government will prove conduct that constitutes an offense
for which the defendant has already been prosecuted." '6
Dixon used the suggested Grady analysis by first determining whether
Blockburger permits subsequent prosecution in the criminal contempt con-
text where the criminal act was prohibited by judicial order. 7 The court
found that at least some of the criminal charges were barred by Blockburger
because the elements were the same as the previous contempt offense.8 For
those criminal charges that were not barred by Blockburger, the court pro-
ceeded to determine if they were barred by the Grady test.9 The court found
that they were barred by Grady but then concluded that Grady must be
overruled. 10
The Supreme Court overruled Grady because "[t]he 'same conduct' rule it
announced is wholly inconsistent with earlier Supreme Court precedent and
with the clear common-law understanding of double jeopardy.""II Accord-
ing to the court, Grady was a mistake that should not be saved by the rule of
stare decisis. 12 In reality, however, the overruling of Grady was a result
driven decision that ignored the historical underpinnings of Grady.
Prior to Dixon the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals considered the appli-
cation of Grady in several different decisions. For example, in State v.
Houth 13 the Court of Criminal Appeals addressed the question of whether a
conviction for failure to maintain a single lane would bar a subsequent prose-
cution for driving while intoxicated arising out of the same incident. The
Court of Criminal Appeals construed Grady to mean that an offense for
which the defendant has already been prosecuted will bar a subsequent pros-
ecution only if the state will rely on evidence of conduct of the first offense to
prove an essential element of the subsequent prosecution.' 4 Only when the
prosecutor will rely solely on evidence of unprosecuted conduct to prove the
essential elements of the subsequent prosecution is the second prosecution
not jeopardy barred. 15 The Court of Criminal Appeals allowed the driving
while intoxicated prosecution to proceed as long as the state relied on evi-
dence other than the defendant's failure to maintain a single lane to prove
the element of driving while intoxicated. 16
5. This test is based on Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1930).
6. 495 U.S. at 510.
7. 113 S. Ct. at 2856.
8. Id. at 2858.
9. Id. at 2859.
10. Id. at 2860.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 2864.
13. 845 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
14. Id. at 864.
15. Id.
16. It is interesting to note that despite the Supreme Court's characterization of Grady as
"wholly inconsistent with earlier Supreme Court precedent," the court of criminal appeals saw
Grady as a logical outgrowth of earlier precedent. United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849,
2864 (1993). See Houth, 845 S.W.2d at 856-60.
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The Court of Criminal Appeals dealt with Grady issues on other occasions
during the Survey period. 17 The court, however, finally recognized the de-
mise of Grady in State v. Holguin.18 There the court returned to the Block-
burger same elements test for determining whether a subsequent prosecution
is barred by double jeopardy.
Strictly speaking, Austin v. United States 19 did not concern the double
jeopardy clause. It was an Eighth Amendment excessive fines clause case. 20
In Austin the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the excessive fines
clause applies to civil forfeitures of property arising out of drug transactions.
The Supreme Court's answer to that question has broad implications not
only in the context of the Eighth Amendment, but also for double jeopardy
jurisprudence.
The purpose of the excessive fines clause, according to the Supreme Court,
was to limit the government's power to punish. 2' Recognizing that civil pro-
ceedings may advance punitive and remedial goals, the court engaged in an
historical review of forfeiture law in order to determine whether civil drug
forfeitures should be considered punishment. 22 The court concluded "that
forfeiture generally and statutory in rem forfeiture in particular historically
have been understood, at least in part, as punishment. '23 Similarly, forfeit-
ures under the specific statutory punishment scheme at issue in A ustin were
found to be punishment. 24
The holding that civil forfeitures arising out of drug transactions are in-
tended to punish is significant in the double jeopardy context, because one of
the abuses against which the double jeopardy clause protects is multiple pun-
ishments for the same offense.25 Once a civil forfeiture is characterized as
punishment, then the protection against multiple punishments applies. This
could cause a major shift in forfeiture litigation, because most courts had
assumed that the double jeopardy clause did not apply to civil forfeiture
proceedings. 26 Prosecutors will now be forced to determine whether to con-
solidate a forfeiture action with a criminal action or whether to abandon a
forfeiture claim. Defense attorneys will have to decide whether to allow
17. See, e.g., Parrish v. State, 851 S.W.2d 864 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Hensley v. State,
851 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Leman v. State, 845 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. Crim. App.
1992).
18. 861 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
19. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
20. Amendment VIII of the U.S. Constitution states: "Excessive bail shall not be re-
quired, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII.
21. 113 S. Ct. at 2805.
22. Id. at 2806.
23. Id. at 2810.
24. Id. at 2810-11 (The statute in question in Austin was 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) and
(a)(7)).
25. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
26. See, e.g., United States v. A Parcel of Land, 884 F.2d 41, 43 (st Cir. 1989). Many of
these decisions were based on language in United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms,
465 U.S. 354 (1984), which indicated that the double jeopardy clause did not apply to civil
forfeiture proceedings. This language, however, was limited to cases where the forfeiture could
be characterized as remedial. Id. at 364.
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seized property to be forfeited in order to set up a double jeopardy bar to a
criminal prosecution.
In Proctor v. State27 the Court of Criminal Appeals explained the proce-
dure that the State must follow to abandon or dismiss charges if the State
wants to preserve the charges for later prosecution. The court held that the
State may press a charge at a later time if the charge is affirmatively aban-
doned or dismissed with the trial court's permission before jeopardy at-
taches. 28 In Sanchez v. State29 the State failed to comply with this rule. The
State dismissed a charging instrument after jeopardy attached and then tried
to pursue the charge on a later date. The Court of Criminal Appeals barred
the prosecution on double jeopardy grounds. 30
Granger v. State31 pondered the question of whether the double jeopardy
clause bars a prosecution for murder when the accused was previously con-
victed of capital murder, the conviction was reversed on appeal due to the
insufficiency of the evidence to prove the capital element, and the jury
charge at the capital murder trial included instructions on capital murder
and murder.32 In answering this question the court first applied the Block-
burger analysis to the two offenses and concluded that for purposes of double
jeopardy the two offenses are the same. 33 The court did not stop there, how-
ever. Even though capital murder and murder are the same offense in the
context of the double jeopardy clause, the court did not view the double
jeopardy clause as an absolute bar to the subsequent prosecution. 34 The re-
versal of the original capital murder decision did not constitute a decision
that the lesser offense of murder was not proved. In fact, since the jury
found the accused guilty of capital murder, the Court of Criminal Appeals
believed the jury would have convicted the defendant of murder if given only
that option. 35 Since an instruction on the lesser offense of murder was given
and the accused was not acquitted of that offense, the double jeopardy clause
does not bar the murder prosecution.3 6 The unfortunate aspect of this deci-
sion is that it allows the state a second chance to convict the accused when it
was the state that selected the charge for which the evidence was insufficient.
Surely the double jeopardy clause was intended to prevent the state from
taking such multiple shots at the accused.
27. 841 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
28. Id. at 4.
29. 845 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
30. Id. at 276.
31. 850 S.W.2d 513 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
32. The Court of Criminal Appeals previously held that a reversal of a conviction based
on the insufficiency of the evidence to prove an aggravating element bars a later prosecution
for a lesser included offense when the trial court had neither instructed on the lesser included
offense nor erroneously refused the State's request for such an instruction. State v. Engelking,
817 S.W.2d 64, 67 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Stephen v. State, 806 S.W.2d 812, 814 n.4 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 350 (1991).
33. 850 S.W.2d at 516-17.
34. Id. at 517.
35. Id. at 519.
36. Id. at 519-20.
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In Ex parte Carter 37 the San Antonio Court of Appeals explained the
proper procedure for obtaining a pretrial appellate determination of a double
jeopardy issue.38 First, an application for a pretrial writ of habeas corpus
must be filed in the trial court.3 9 The trial court should be requested to issue
a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to that application and then make a deter-
mination on the merits of the applicant's claim for relief. If relief is denied
on the merits, then the applicant may appeal the denial of that relief.4° A
failure of the trial court to issue the writ of habeas corpus, even if a hearing
is held by the trial court, precludes an appeal.4 ' There is no appeal from a
denial of a habeas corpus application or a refusal to issue a writ. An appeal
may be taken only from the denial of relief following the issuance of a pre-
trial writ of habeas corpus.42
Finally, in Ex parte Scales43 a little life was breathed back into the old
carving doctrine.44 The carving doctrine barred "multiple prosecutions and
convictions carved out of a single criminal transaction" 45 and thus provided
protections similar to those of the double jeopardy clause. 46 The carving
doctrine was abandoned by the Court of Criminal Appeals in 1980.47 The
abandonment was made retroactive in 1984.48 Scales overruled the decision
that made the abandonment of the carving doctrine retroactive because that
decision constituted an ex post facto law. 49 The carving doctrine will there-
fore continue to apply to criminal transactions that occurred before 1982.
II. DISCOVERY
The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed two cases during the Survey pe-
riod because of the State's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence. In
Thomas v. State 10 two witnesses testified to seeing the accused drag the de-
ceased behind an apartment building and shoot him. A third witness was
interviewed by the prosecutor and an investigator prior to trial. That wit-
ness said he saw the accused in front of the apartment building and someone
else behind the building with a gun. The prosecutor did not call this witness
to testify at trial nor did the prosecutor reveal the witness to the defendant
37. 849 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1993, pet. ref'd).
38. A special plea pursuant to TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 27.05 (Vernon 1989)
may also be used to assert a double jeopardy claim. The denial of a special plea may only be
appealed following the entry of a final judgment in the case.
39. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.01 (Vernon 1977).
40. 849 S.W.2d at 413.
41. Id.
42. Id.




47. Exparte McWilliams, 634 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1036 (1982).
48. Ex parte Clay, 675 S.W.2d 765 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1029
(1985).
49. 853 S.W.2d at 588.
50. 841 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
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even though the defendant had filed a motion seeking exculpatory evidence.
The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction because of the prose-
cutor's failure to disclose the witness.5' The court held that a prosecutor
violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment when the prose-
cutor: 1) fails to disclose evidence, 2) which is favorable to the accused, 3)
that creates a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome
of the proceeding. 52 The testimony of the unrevealed witness met these cri-
teria because it tended to exculpate the defendant and to impeach the state's
two witnesses. 53 The Court of Criminal Appeals emphasized in Thomas that
the State has an affirmative duty to disclose evidence favorable and material
to a defendant's guilt or punishment with or without a request for the
evidence. 54
In Ex parte Mitchell 55 the county sheriff's office suppressed the testimony
of two witnesses who could have cast doubt on the testimony of two accom-
plice witnesses as to the time of the offense. The witnesses were not revealed
to the prosecutors or defense counsel. Nevertheless, the Court of Criminal
Appeals held the state responsible for the failure to reveal the witnesses,
because the witness' statements were concealed by agents of the State.5 6 Re-
lying on the authority of Thomas, the Court of Criminal Appeals overturned
the conviction, because the suppressed evidence was both exculpatory to the
accused and could be used to impeach the accomplice testimony. 57 In addi-
tion, failure to reveal the evidence hampered the ability of the accused to
prepare a defense. 58
Thomas and Mitchell illustrate the difficulty of allowing the state to decide
what evidence is exculpatory and what should be turned over to defense
counsel. Clearly trial judges should take a more active role in reviewing the
prosecution's files, examining the prosecution's witnesses, etc. in order to
insure that all exculpatory evidence is revealed to the defense.
In Espinosa v. State 59 the Court of Criminal Appeals clarified the proce-
dure for requesting notice of the State's intent to offer evidence at trial of
extraneous offenses. 6° The court said the request should be in writing and
served on the prosecution. 6 1 "The better practice would be for a defendant
to file a separate document entitled Request for Notice of Intent to Offer
Extraneous Offenses specifically referring to the provisions of Rule 404(b)"
51. Id. at 407.
52. Id. at 404.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 407.
55. 853 S.W.2d I (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 183 (1993).
56. Id. at 4.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 5.
59. 853 S.W.2d 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
60. Rule 404(b) of the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence requires the state, upon timely
request by the accused, to give reasonable notice "in advance of trial of intent to introduce in
the state's case in chief such evidence other than that arising in the same transaction." TEX.
R. CRiM. EVID. 404(b).
61. 853 S.W.2d at 38.
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of the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence.62 Placing the request for notice of
extraneous offenses in a discovery motion directed to the trial court rather
than the state does not automatically trigger the State's obligation to provide
notice.63 When a defendant relies on a discovery motion to request notice he
must secure a ruling on the motion in order to require the State to provide
the requested notice.64 A simple Rule 404(b) request directed to the State
need not be acted on by the trial court before the State is obligated to com-
ply.65 In other words, the State should simply tell the defense about extrane-
ous offenses once a proper request is made without the intervention of the
trial court.
The State's right to discovery of a tape of an interview between a defense
investigator and a state's witness was at issue in Washington v. State.66 The
defense relied on the work-product doctrine to resist discovery. The court
held that the tape was protected work-product.67 In reaching this conclu-
sion the court analyzed the scope of the work-product doctrine with respect
to the State's rights. The court pointed out that traditionally "a recording of
a statement made by a witness without any questions by the interviewer is
clearly discoverable." 68 On the other hand, a recording is not discoverable if
it contains comments by the attorney concerning his trial strategy or opin-
ions regarding the case.69 Between these extremes, the trial court must ex-
amine the tape in camera and decide which portions of the tape, if any, are
discoverable. 70 The tape here was protected by the work-product doctrine
because it was made in an attempt to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses
of the State's case and to prepare the defense case. 71 The work-product priv-
ilege was not waived by using information from the tape to cross-examine
the state's witness.72
The Legislature amended that portion of the Government Code governing
the crimestoppers program to provide a procedure for a defendant to file a
motion with the trial court to obtain exculpatory information from the
records of the crimestoppers program. 73 This amendment eliminated the
statutory requirement that the Texas Supreme Court authorize the release of
crimestoppers information. 74
III. BAIL
In fixing the amount of bail in a particular case a judge or magistrate may
62. Id. at 38 n.3.
63. Id. at 39.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 38.
66. 856 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
67. Id. at 187.




72. Id. at 189.
73. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 414.008(b)(c)(d)(e) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
74. See TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 414.008(b) (Vernon 1993) prior to amendment.
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now consider the future safety of the community.7 This amendment was
apparently designed to encourage trial judges to set high bail for dangerous
offenders. This is a not so subtle attempt by the Legislature to deny defend-
ants' bail despite the Constitutional right to bail in most cases. 76
For a defendant charged with the new offense of stalking77 a defendant
may be ordered, as a condition of release on bond, not to "communicate
directly or indirectly with the victim" or "go to or near the residence, place
of employment, or business of the victim or to or near a school, day-care
facility, or similar facility where a dependent child of the victim is in attend-
ance." 78 This statute and the stalking law itself represent the latest in fad
criminal laws.
Cash bonds have traditionally been forfeited and turned into fines and
convictions upon the non-appearance of the defendant in court. This was
generally done without any notice to the defendant and thus was subject to
abuse. The Legislature changed this procedure during the Survey period to
require courts to notify a defendant of a judgment and forfeiture. 79 The
Legislature also gave defendants the right to a new trial in the case if the new
trial is requested within ten days after the date of the judgment and
forfeiture.8 0
The Code of Criminal Procedure requires the trial court to release a de-
fendant from custody either on personal bond or by reducing the amount of
bail required if the state is not ready for trial within certain specified time
periods for various degrees of offenses. 8 ' A reduction in the amount of bail
required for release to an amount that the defendant still cannot post does
not comply with the statute.8 2 The defendant must be released from custody
if the state is not ready for trial within the specified time period. There are
no exceptions to this statute.83
The San Antonio Court of Appeals provided a good review of the rules for
fixing the amount of bail in Ex parte McDonald.8 4 McDonald was indicted
for capital murder. He was unable to post the $1,000,000 bail amount in lieu
of which he was detained in custody. After reviewing numerous cases con-
cerning the setting of pretrial bail amounts, the court of appeals reduced
McDonald's bail to $75,000.85
IV. COMPETENCY
Richard Moran killed three people, including his former wife, and then
75. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.15, 5 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
76. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 11.
77. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07(a)(7) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
78. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.46(a) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
79. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 45.231(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
80. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 45.231(b)(2) and (c) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
81. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.151 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
82. Rowe v. State, 853 S.W.2d 581, 582 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
83. Id.
84. 852 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1993, no pet. h.).
85. Id. at 736.
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tried to kill himself.86 Moran survived and was charged with three counts of
capital murder.87 Moran entered not guilty pleas to the charges.88 The trial
court ordered Moran examined by two psychiatrists, and both determined
that Moran was competent and could stand trial.8 9 The death penalty was
then sought by the State.90 Subsequently, Moran requested permission to
discharge his attorneys and change his pleas to guilty.91 The trial court ac-
cepted Moran's waiver of his right to counsel and his guilty pleas after prop-
erly admonishing him regarding the consequences of both. In Godinez, the
Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a different standard of compe-
tency applied for pleading guilty or waiving the right to counsel than for
standing trial. The Supreme Court characterized this question as one that
has split both the federal courts of appeals and the state courts of last resort.
Dusky v. United States92 held that the standard for competence to stand
trial is whether the defendant has "sufficient present ability to consult with
his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding" and "a ra-
tional as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him."'93
The Supreme Court in Godinez rejected the notion that a standard higher
than or different from Dusky applied to the decision to plead guilty or to
waive the right to counsel. 94 The same standard applies across the board in
criminal cases. The dissent, however, pointed out that this monolithic ap-
proach to competency is "true to neither life nor the law" because
"[c]ompetency for one purpose does not necessarily translate to competency
for another purpose." 95
V. CHARGING INSTRUMENTS
Obed Aguilar was charged by information with the offense of driving
while intoxicated. The complaint upon which the information was based
stated that it was sworn out on a date before the offense allegedly occurred.
Aguilar did not point this defect out to the trial court. Subsequently, Agui-
lar was convicted of driving while intoxicated. Aguilar then argued on ap-
peal that the discrepancy in the complaint rendered the information void. 96
The Code of Criminal Procedure requires an information to be based on a
complaint.97 Prior to the 1985 amendment to article V, section 12(b) of the




90. Id. at 2682-83.
91. Id. at 2683.
92. 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
93. Id. at 402.
94. 113 S. Ct. at 2686.
95. 113 S. Ct. at 2694 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
96. Aguilar v. State, 846 S.W.2d 318 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
97. The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides in part that -[n]o information shall
be presented until affidavit has been made by some credible person charging the defendant with
an offense." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 21.22 (Vernon Supp. 1994). See also, TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 15.04 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
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Texas Constitution98 an information based on an invalid complaint was con-
sidered fundamentally defective. 99 Error concerning such an information
and complaint could be raised, for the first time, on appeal since it went to
the jurisdiction of the court to try the case.' °° Now, however, the mere
presentment of an information to a trial court invests that court with juris-
diction over the person of the defendant, regardless of any defect that might
exist in the underlying complaint. '0 ' Defects in information and complaints
must be raised before trial or they will be waived. 102 There is no more laying
behind the log where a defective charging instrument is concerned.
VI. JOINDER AND SEVERANCE OF OFFENSES
The Texas Penal Code allows the state to join several different charging
instruments in a single trial if the alleged offenses arose out of the same
criminal episode and the state gives written notice at least thirty days before
trial of the consolidation of the charging instruments for trial. 03 A defend-
ant, however, does not have the right to consolidate for trial several different
charging instruments even if the offenses were committed in the same crimi-
nal episode. 104 On the other hand, a defendant may force a severance of
multiple charging instruments that were consolidated for trial by the
state. 105 The failure to grant a severance requested by the defendant is re-
versible error not subject to a harmless error analysis.' 0 6
VII. SEVERANCE OF DEFENDANTS
Both federal and state law allow the joinder for trial of defendants alleged
to have participated in the same offense or transaction. 0 7 Both federal and
state law provide for the severance of defendants if a joint trial would preju-
dice a defendant.' 0 8 In Zafiro v. United States 109 the Supreme Court was
asked to decide whether mutually antagonistic defenses create sufficient prej-
udice to justify a severance as a matter of law. 1 0
Gloria Zafiro and three other persons were prosecuted for distributing ille-
gal drugs. All of the defendants moved for severance alleging that their de-
fenses were mutually antagonistic."' The trial court denied the severance
98. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 12(b).




103. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 3.02(b) (Vernon Supp. 1994); Wedlow v. State, 807
S.W.2d 847, 850 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, pet. refd).
104. Nelson v. State, 864 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
105. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 3.04(a) (Vernon Supp. 1994); Coleman v. State, 788
S.W.2d 369, 371 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (defendant's right to a severance is absolute).
106. Warmowski v. State, 853 S.W.2d 575, 581 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
107. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.09 (Vernon Supp. 1994); FED. R. CRIM. P.
8(b).
108. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.09 (Vernon Supp. 1994); FED. R. CRIM. P. 14.
109. 113 S. Ct. 933 (1993).
110. Id. at 933.
111. Defendant Soto argued that he did not know the contents of the box in which drugs
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motions and tried all four defendants together.
The Supreme Court first noted the preference in the federal system for
joint trials.' 12 The court then held that a severance should be granted "only
if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial
right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable
judgment about guilt or innocence." ' 1 3 Such prejudice may arise if many
defendants of differing levels of culpability are tried together, when evidence
of a codefendant's wrongdoing could erroneously be considered against the
defendant, or when exculpatory evidence that would be available to a de-
fendant tried alone is excluded in a joint trial.' 14 In other words, the risk of
prejudice is a factual determination that must be made by the trial court."'
Mutually antagonistic defenses are not prejudicial as a matter of law. 116 The
fact that a defendant may have a better chance of acquittal in a separate trial
does not entitle the defendant to a severance. 1 7 A defendant is entitled to a
severance only if a joint trial would result in some legally cognizable preju-
dice as determined by the trial court." 18
Zafiro demonstrates the difficulty, particularly in the federal system, of
obtaining a severance. There is a decided preference for trying defendants
together in the name of judicial economy and thereby sacrificing an accused
person's right to a fair trial.
VIII. RECUSAL
In Arnold v. State 119 the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the proce-
dures of rule 18a in the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure governing the recusal
of trial judges apply to criminal cases. 120 Because the appellants in Arnold
failed to comply with the ten-day notice provision in Rule 18a, they waived
their appellate complaint of the denial of the opportunity to have their
recusal motions heard by a judge other than the judge assigned to hear their
case. 121
IX. VISITING JUDGES
Most lawyers know that they have the right to object to the assignment of
were found. Id. at 936. Garcia claimed ignorance of the contents of the box and said the box
belonged to Soto. Id. Defendant Zafiro said she was only defendant Martinez's girlfriend and
knew nothing about drugs found in a suitcase stored in her closet. Id. Martinez, however, said
he was only visiting his girlfriend's apartment and did not know about the drugs in the suit-
case. Id.
112. Id. at 937.





118. Id. at 939.
119. 853 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
120. Id. at 544.
121. Id. at 544-45; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a (recusal motion must be filed at least ten days
before date set for trial or other hearing in trial court.)
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a visiting judge to hear a civil case. 122 In 1991 the statute from which this
right derives was amended to provide that "[a] former judge or justice who
was not a retired judge may not sit in a case if either party objects to that
judge or justice."' 123 Since this amendment did not specifically state that it
was limited to civil cases, the Harris County District Attorney objected to
the assignment of a former judge to hear a criminal case. In Lanford v.
Fourteenth Court of Appeals 124 the court of criminal appeals determined that
the amendment was ambiguous in that it could be understood to apply to
civil cases only or to civil and criminal cases. 125 Then, by considering ex-
tratextual factors the court concluded that the amendment applied only to
civil cases.126 The Harris County District Attorney was therefore not enti-
tled to challenge the assignment of a former judge to hear a criminal case.
X. WAIVER OF JURY
Prior to 1991 Article 1.13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allowed a
defendant in a felony prosecution less than capital to waive his right to a
trial by jury if the waiver was made in writing with the consent and approval
of the prosecutor and the court. 127 In Meek v. State 128 the Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals held that the failure of a defendant to sign a jury waiver in
compliance with the Code of Criminal Procedure (when the defendant was
tried without a jury) is reversible error that is not subject to a harm analy-
sis. 129 The court even went so far as to state that application of the harmless
error rule to the failure to sign a jury waiver is "perverse and
inappropriate." 130
In 1991 Article 1.13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was amended so
as to make it applicable to all criminal prosecutions other than a prosecution
for a capital felony in which the state seeks the death penalty.' 3' Conse-
quently, the state now has the right to a jury trial in both felony and misde-
122. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 74.053 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
123. Id. § 74.083(d).
124. 847 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
125. Id. at 587.
126. Id. The court based its conclusion on several factors: 1) before the statute was
amended it applied only to civil cases; 2) there was nothing in the legislative history of the
amendment which suggests it should be applied to civil and criminal cases; 3) applying the
statute to criminal cases would give prosecutors inordinate power that legislators did not con-
template; and 4) extending the right to challenge former judges to criminal cases would give
prosecutors and defense attorneys the right to automatic continuances). Id. at 586-87.
127. Article 1.13 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provided in relevant part, prior
to amendment: "The defendant in a criminal prosecution for any offense classified as a felony
less than capital shall have the right, upon entering a plea, to waive the right of trial by jury,
conditioned, however, that such waiver must be made in person by the defendant in writing in
open court with the consent and approval of the court, and the attorney representing the
State." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 1.13 (Vernon 1990).
128. 851 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
129. Id. at 871.
130. Id.
131. Article 1.13 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure now provides in relevant part:
"The defendant in a criminal prosecution for any offense other than a capital felony case in
which the State notifies the court and the defendant that it will seek the death penalty shall





In a controversial opinion with potentially far-reaching implications the
Court of Criminal Appeals reversed a capital murder case based on the trial
court's erroneous granting of a state's challenge for cause to a jury venire-
man. In Garrett v. State ' 33 the court held that a venireman who stated that
he could not answer the special issue regarding future dangerousness of the
defendant 3 4 affirmatively based upon the facts of the crime alone was not
challengeable for cause by the state. 135
During the Garrett voir dire, the juror made it unmistakably clear that he
could not find that the defendant would engage in acts of violence in the
future based strictly upon the facts of the case being tried. 136 The state chal-
lenged the juror for cause based on Article 35.16(b)(3) of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure.137 Under this code provision, a juror is challengeable
for cause if he harbors some bias or prejudice against some aspect of the law
upon which the state is entitled to rely. The trial court agreed with the
State's challenge, and the juror was excused over the defendant's
objection. 138
In reversing the case, the Court of Criminal Appeals cited cases holding
that the facts of a capital crime, if severe enough, will support a jury verdict
of yes to the future dangerousness issue.13 9 However, the court explained
that none of these cases require a particular jury, or an individual juror, to
answer the special issue yes based on the facts of a particular case, and that
the cited cases concern reviews of the sufficiency of the evidence and not
questions of qualification of a juror. 140
The court went on to explain that a particular juror's understanding of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt may lead him to require more than the
minimum amount of evidence necessary to sustain a finding of future dan-
gerousness on appeal.' 4 1 The fact that a juror may set his threshold of rea-
approval of... the attorney representing the state." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.13
(Vernon. Supp. 1994).
132. State v. Carr, 847 S.W.2d 561, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
133. 851 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
134. Article 37.071(b)(2) states the following:
(b) On conclusion of the presentation of the evidence, the court shall submit the
following three issues to the jury:
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
135. 851 S.W.2d at 859-61.
136. Id. at 857-59.
137. "(b) A challenge for cause may be made by the state for any of the following reasons:
(3) that he has a bias or prejudice against any phase of the law upon which the state is
entitled to rely for conviction or punishment." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.16(b)(3)
(Vernon Supp. 1994).
138. 851 S.W.2d at 859.
139. Id. at 859 n.3 & 4.
140. Id. at 859-60.
141. Id. at 860.
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sonable doubt higher than the minimum required to sustain a jury verdict on
appeal does not indicate that he has a bias or prejudice against the law. 142
He is therefore not challengeable for cause under Article 35.16(b)(3).14 3 Ac-
cording to the court, if the State did not want this juror to serve they were
required to exercise a peremptory challenge against him. 144
In dissent, Judge Campbell complained that the majority ignored stare
decisis and effectively overruled substantial established case law. 14 5 Judge
Campbell also predicted that the reasoning of Garrett would lead to an over-
ruling of other cases upholding state's challenges for cause. 14 6 Specifically,
Judge Campbell argued that Garrett was inconsistent with cases holding that
the State may challenge for cause jurors who could never answer the future
dangerousness issue yes unless the defendant was a serial killer. 147 Judge
Campbell also stated that Garrett is inconsistent with cases holding the State
may challenge jurors for cause who could never find the defendant guilty
based on the testimony of one witness, 148 or based on circumstantial evi-
dence. 149 Likewise, he found Garrett to be inconsistent with cases holding
that a juror was challengeable for cause if the defendant was not the trigger-
man, and the juror could not answer the future dangerousness issue
affirmatively. 150
Judge Campbell's predictions of the future implications of Garrett have
not yet come to pass. However, his reasoning that Garrett is inconsistent
with the other parallel cases appears sound. Based on the frequent repetition
of the type of issues discussed in Garrett, this case is likely to have a substan-
tial impact on future jury selection issues.
In another capital murder case, a badly divided Court of Criminal
Appeals' 5 ' held that only one shuffle of the jury venire is author-
ized under Article 35.11 of the 52 Texas Code of Criminal Proce-
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 859-60.
145. Id. at 861.
146. Id. at 863.
147. Fuller v. State, 829 S.W.2d 191, 199-01 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 2418 (1993).
148. Caldwell v. State, 818 S.W.2d 790, 797 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 1684 (1992).
149. Barnard v. State, 730 S.W.2d 703, 712-14 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 990 (1993).
150. Phillips v. State, 701 S.W.2d 875, 883-84 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985), cert. denied, 477
U.S. 909 (1986).
151. Majority opinion by Judge Baird, with Judge Maloney joining only in part. Dissents
by Presiding Judge McCormick and Judges Miller, Meyers and Overstreet.
152. Article 35.11 states:
The trial judge, on the demand of the Defendant or his attorney, or of the State's
counsel, shall cause a sufficient number of jurors from which a jury may be
selected to try the case to be randomly selected from the members of the general
panel drawn or assigned as jurors in the case. The clerk shall randomly select
the jurors by a computer or other process of random selection and shall write or
print the names, in the order selected, on the jury list from which the jury is to
be selected to try the case. The clerk shall deliver a copy of the list to the State's
counsel and to the defendant or his attorney.
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dure. 15 3 In Chappell the court reversed the conviction based on the trial
court's granting the state a jury shuffle after the venire was already shuffled
on the defendant's motion.1 54 Citing several recent cases indicating that
only one proper shuffle is allowed under Article 35.1 ,155 the court explicitly
held that only one shuffle is allowed. 156 Whether the State or defense re-
quests the shuffle, if it is properly done, the other party is precluded from a
second shuffle.157
The court also rejected the State's argument that the granting of the sec-
ond shuffle was harmless error.158 Following well-established precedent, the
court held that no injury need be shown by a defendant to obtain reversal
when the jury shuffle rules of Article 35.11 are violated. 159 Article 35.11 was
characterized as a mandatory statute,160 a violation of which is not subject
to a harm analysis under Rule 81 (b)(2) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Pro-
cedure. 161 Citing Roberts v. State 162 the court explained that, "in cases in-
volving breach of many procedural statutes, the record will contain no
concrete data from which an appellate court can meaningfully gauge that the
error did or did not contribute to the conviction or punishment of the ac-
cused."' 163 Since the State has the burden under Rule 81(b)(2) to prove
harmlessness, and the trial record is insufficient to resolve the issue, reversal
is required.
In Batson v. Kentucky 164 the Supreme Court held that race was not a
legitimate basis for the exercise of a peremptory challenge. ' 65 Under Batson,
a party can challenge his opponents exercise of peremptory strikes and under
certain procedural rules require his opponent to justify the exercise of his
peremptory strikes based on non-racial reasons. The question of whether the
procedural framework of Batson and its progeny should be extended to gen-
der-based peremptory strikes was recently addressed by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. In U.S. v. Broussard 166 the court
held that Batson does not extend to gender-based discrimination in the exer-
cise of peremptory strikes. 167
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.11 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
153. Chappell v. State, 850 S.W.2d 508, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
154. Id. at 511-12.
155. Jones v. State, 833 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Davis v. State, 782 S.W.2d
211 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
156. 850 S.W.2d at 511.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 512-13.
159. See Fotenot v. State, 379 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964).
160. 850 S.W.2d at 512
161. Rule 81(b)(2) states: "If the appellate record in a criminal case reveals error in the
proceedings below, the appellate court shall reverse the judgment under review, unless the
appellate court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to
the conviction or to the punishment." TEX. R. App. P. 81(b)(2).
162. 784 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
163. Id. at 435.
164. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
165. Id. at 138.
166. 987 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1993).
167. Id. at 217.
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In concluding that gender-based strikes are not covered by Batson, the
court found that while equal protection principles recognize women as a pro-
tected class, the level of scrutiny of actions against women is less than that
applied to questions of racial discrimination. 168 Additionally, the court
stated that women were not a numerical minority and did not face the same
barriers to full jury participation as faced by racial minorities. 169 Based on
this, the court concluded that the prophylactic protections that Batson gives
to racial minorities is not necessary to protect women from discrimination in
jury selection. 170
By declining to extend Batson to gender-based discrimination, the Fifth
Circuit aligned itself with the Fourth Circuit which had previously reached
the same conclusion. 17 1 The court disagreed with the contrary holding of
U.S. v. De Gross,172 where the Ninth Circuit applied Batson to gender-based
discrimination. Several state courts reaching various results were also
cited. 173 The United States Supreme Court17 4 and the Texas Court of Crim-
inal Appeals have yet to address this issue.
XII. JURY QUESTIONING OF WITNESSES
The incipient experiment of allowing jurors to submit questions to wit-
nesses was recently brought to an abrupt end in the Texas criminal courts by
the Court of Criminal Appeals. In Morrison v. State 175 the court ruled that
jurors will not be permitted to question witnesses. 176 While recognizing that
many other courts have allowed the practice, 177 the Court of Criminal Ap-
peals concluded that juror questioning undermines the adversary nature of
the criminal justice system and removes the jury from its role as a passive
fact finder.17 8 The majority opinion cited concerns that allowing jurors to
submit questions could lead the jurors to draw conclusions or settle on a
given legal theory before the parties completed their presentations and
before the court instructed the jury on the law.179
In Morrison the trial court allowed the jurors to question witnesses by
means of submitting written questions to the court.180 While this was but
168. Id. at 218-20.
169. Id. at 220.
170. Id.
171. United States v. Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038 (4th Cir. 1988).
172. 960 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
173. State v. Culver, 444 N.W.2d 662 (Neb. 1989) (refusing to apply Batson to gender);
State v. Oliviera, 534 A.2d 867 (R.I. 1987) (refusing to apply Batson to gender); People v.
Irizarry, 165 A.D.2d 715 (N.Y. 1990) (extending Batson to gender).
174. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address this question in J.E.B. v. T.B., No.
92-1239. Oral argument was presented on November 2, 1993 and a decision is expected during
the current term of the court.
175. 845 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
176. Id. at 884-89.
177. Id. at 884 n.5.
178. Id. at 885.
179. Id. at 887.
180. Morrison stated the following:
The trial judge instructed the jury that following each witness jurors could sub-
mit questions to the court to be asked of that witness. The court would rule on
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one method of allowing juror questioning, the Court of Criminal Appeals
nevertheless has flatly banned the practice.
In the area of jury service, the legislature added Article 44.46 to the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure""' in an effort to avoid reversals of convictions
when a disqualified person serves as a juror. Under the new statute, reversal
based on jury service by a disqualified person will be rare.
XIII. EVIDENCE
The long held maxim that a witness can be impeached with prior convic-
tions for felonies or misdemeanors involving moral turpitude was recently
clarified by the Court of Criminal Appeals in Theus v. State. 182 In the
course of a detailed explanation of the law on impeachment the court made
it clear that a trial court cannot admit any and all felony convictions for
impeachment purposes without a close consideration of the limitations of
Rule 609(a)' 8 3 of the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence.
Joe Theus was charged with the offenses of possessing and delivering co-
caine. 184 During Theus's jury trial, the State was allowed to impeach his
testimony with evidence of a prior arson conviction. 185 The court found that
the trial court had erred in allowing the impeachment and reversed and re-
manded the case to the court of appeals for a harm analysis.186
In finding the evidence concerning the arson conviction inadmissible, the
court dealt with two different proposed reasons for its admissibility. Ini-
tially, the court found that the arson conviction was not admissible in order
to correct an alleged false impression left by Theus concerning his lawful
character. 187
the questions outside of the presence of the jury. If a question was ruled admis-
sible, the judge would recall the jury and reads the question to the witness. The
parties were allowed to ask follow-up questions of the witness, limited to the
subject matter of the juror's question. Appellant objected to the process on the
grounds that it is not authorized by law. Appellant's objection was overruled,
but appellant perfected a running objection to "the whole process." Id. at 833
n. 1.
181. A conviction in a criminal case may be reversed on appeal on the ground that a juror
in the case was absolutely disqualified from service under Article 35.19 of this code only if:
(1) the defendant raises the disqualification before the verdict is entered; or
(2) the disqualification was not discovered or brought to the attention of the trial court until
after the verdict was entered and the defendant makes a showing of significant harm by the
service of the disqualified juror. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.46 (Vernon Supp.
1994).
182. 845 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
183. Rule 609(a) states:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has
been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or established by
public record but only if the crime was a felony or involved moral turpitude,
regardless of punishment, and the court determines that the probative value of
admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to a party.
TEX, R. CRIM. EvID. 609(a).
184. 845 S.W.2d at 874.
185. Id. at 876.
186. Id. at 882.
187. Id. at 878-79.
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In Prescott v. State 1 88 the court held that "when a witness, during direct
examination, leaves a false impression as to the extent of either his prior (1)
arrests, (2) convictions, (3) charges, or (4) 'trouble' with the police," 189 he
may be impeached with incidents that would otherwise not be available for
impeachment.' 90 The State argued that Theus had left a false impression
with the jury, and therefore the arson conviction was admissible on this
basis.
Theus testified that he ran a tire store, had never sold drugs and that he
had reported a drug dealer to the police.' 91 He also presented witnesses that
testified he was not involved with drugs. 192 The court noted, however, that
Theus "in no way asserted that he had never been convicted of a felony."' 193
For this reason, Theus had not given the jury a false impression which the
State was entitled to rebut by introducing the prior arson conviction. 194
The court likewise found the prior conviction inadmissible under Rule
609.195 Initially, the court rejected Theus' argument that a showing of rele-
vance was necessary in order to render a prior conviction admissible for im-
peachment.196 The court stated relevance is not a consideration under Rule
609.197 Therefore, if a felony is to be deemed inadmissible for impeachment
under Rule 609, it must be on the basis that its probative value is outweighed
by its prejudicial effect. It is on this basis that the court found the arson
conviction inadmissible. 198
The court drew from federal cases in identifying a number of factors to
consider in weighing the probative value of a conviction against its prejudi-
cial effect. 199 These factors include, 1) the impeachment value of the prior
crime, 2) the temporal proximity of the past crime relative to the charged
offense and the witness's subsequent history, 3)'the similarity between the
past crime and the offense being prosecuted, 4) the importance of the defend-
ant's testimony, and 5) the importance of the credibility issue.2°°
These factors are not to be applied with mathematical precision and the
weight of their applications will vary from case to case. The court did, how-
ever, provide general guidelines for application of these factors. For in-
stance, it was noted that the impeachment value of crimes that involve
deception is higher than crimes that involve violence, and the latter have a
188. 744 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
189. Id. at 130.
190. Id. at 131.
191. 845 S.W.2d at 879.
192. Id. at 879.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 879.
195. Id. at 879-82.
196. Id. at 879; see also United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(interpreting federal counterpart to Rule 609, the court found that, "Congress believed that all
felonies have some probative value on the issue of credibility.").
197. 845 S.W.2d at 879.
198. 845 S.W.2d at 881-82.
199. See United States v. Mahone, 537 F.2d 922, 929 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1025
(1976).
200. 845 S.W.2d at 880.
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higher potential for prejudice.201 For this reason, if the crime being used for
impeachment relates more to deception, this weighs in favor of its admissi-
bility. Likewise, if the past crime is recent and the witness has a propensity
for violating the law these factors would favor admissibility. 20 2 However, if
the past crime and the charged offense are similar this will militate against
admissibility because of the high possibility that the jury would convict on
the perception of past conduct rather than the focus of the charged
offense.203
The importance of the defendant's testimony and the importance of the
credibility issue were found to be related. 204 When the defendant presents
his defense through other witnesses, his credibility is not likely to be a criti-
cal issue and he may not need to testify. This would tend to lessen the need
for the State to impeach the defendant and would weigh against admissibility
of the prior offense. However, when the case involves only the testimony of
the defendant and the State's witnesses, the defendant's credibility becomes
more of an issue and the probative value of impeachment evidence
increases.20
5
In applying the five enumerated factors to the question of the admissibility
of the arson conviction the court focused on the facts of the arson in finding
that it had very little probative value as to Theus's credibility. 20 6 The facts
of the arson were that after a domestic dispute with his girlfriend, Theus had
taken a beer can filled with gasoline, poured the gasoline through his girl-
friend's postal slot and then set fire to the postal slot.20 7 The court found
that although most of the five factors weighed in favor of admissibility of the
arson conviction the unique facts of this case compelled a conclusion that
the arson conviction possessed very little probative value and had a great
prejudicial effect.208 This was based on the fact that a jury being told of an
arson conviction could easily conjure up images of burning buildings and
insurance fraud. The potential prejudice was exacerbated by the refusal of
the trial court to allow Theus to present any evidence to the jury of the facts
of the arson. 20 9
The importance of Theus is the message it sends that all felonies are not
automatically admissible for impeachment. Trial courts are expected to en-
gage in a meaningful weighing of the probative value of the evidence of a
prior conviction against its prejudicial effect and run a real risk of reversal if
they erroneously admit impeachment evidence.
201. See United States v. Jackson, 627 F.2d 1198, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
202. See United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824, 828 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 867
(1977).
203. See Jackson, 627 F.2d at 1210.
204. 845 S.W.2d at 881.
205. See United States v. Fountain, 642 F.2d 1083, 1092 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
993 (1981).
206. 845 S.W.2d at 881.
207. Id. at 882.
208. Id. at 881-82.
209. Id. at 882.
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In Rogers v. State2 10 the Court of Criminal Appeals added necessity to the
list of exceptions to the prohibition on admission of evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts found in Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence 404(b).2 1' How-
ever, the facts of Rogers did not meet the court's stringent definition of ne-
cessity and the case was nevertheless reversed and remanded to the court of
appeals for a harm analysis. 2 12
Rogers was charged in a single indictment with two separate offenses of
burglary of a habitation and with possession of methamphetamine. He was
convicted on all three charges in a single trial. In the course of the trial, the
State introduced evidence that several police officers went to appellant's resi-
dence with an arrest warrant for one of the burglary cases. Upon entering
the house, the officers observed appellant sitting on a couch in the living
room, pushing a package down between the cushions of the couch. The of-
ficers recovered the package from the couch and determined that it con-
tained methamphetamine. This formed the basis of the methamphetamine
charge. The officers also searched the house and found marijuana between a
mattress and bed spring in a bedroom. Rogers admitted that the marijuana
was his. 2 13 Additionally, at trial the State offered Rogers' written confession
in which he admitted using and selling marijuana and methamphetamine.
As part of Rogers' confession, he said that he sold methamphetamine to
finance his own drug habit. Rogers' objections to all of this testimony were
overruled. 2 14 The court's opinion in Rogers focused on the admissibility of
the marijuana evidence. 215
The Court of Criminal Appeals relied largely upon Mayes v. State2 16 in
determining the admissibility of this evidence. Mayes set forth a test under
Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence 401 and 404(b) to determine the admissi-
bility of what the court called background evidence. 21 7 The first question is
whether the background evidence is relevant under Rule 401.218 If the back-
ground evidence is relevant, the next question is whether it should be admit-
ted as an exception under Rule 404(b). 219
Applying the Mayes test to Rogers' case, the court first decided that the
210. 853 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
211. Rule 404(b) states:
Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted
in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes,
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, iden-
tity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided, upon timely request by the
accused, reasonable notice is given in advance of trial of intent to introduce in
the State's case in chief such evidence other than that arising in the same
transaction.
TEX. R. CRIM. EvID. 404(b).
212. 853 S.W.2d at 34-35.
213. Id. at 31.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. 816 S.W.2d 79 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
217. Id. at 84-87.
218. Id. at 84.
219. Id. at 85-87.
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marijuana evidence was relevant to the possession of methamphetamine
charge against Rogers. 220 Although the relevancy was deemed questionable,
the court nevertheless held that it was possible that a person who possessed
one type of illegal drug would also be inclined to be in possession of another
illegal drug.221 While not necessarily finding that this type of evidence
would always be relevant, the court held "that it was within the zone of
reasonable disagreement for the trial court to find that the evidence pertain-
ing to the marijuana was relevant. '222
Having accepted that the evidence was relevant, the court next addressed
whether the background evidence was admissible as an exception to Rule
404(b). 223 Citing Montgomery v. State224 the Rogers court stated that the
list of purposes under Rule 404(b) for which "other crimes, acts or wrongs
[are] admissible" is not "exclusive nor collectively exhaustive." 225
In Mayes the court separated evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts
into two categories. 226 These categories were same transaction contextual
evidence and background contextual evidence. 227 The same transaction evi-
dence involves acts, words and conduct of a defendant at the time of the
offense or his arrest. 228 Background contextual evidence is evidence of ex-
traneous matters not occurring at the time of the offense or the defendant's
arrest. 229
The evidence admitted against Rogers concerning the marijuana was char-
acterized as same transaction contextual evidence since it concerned events
at the time of his arrest. 230 In the crux of the opinion, the court found that
same transaction contextual evidence is admissible as an exception under
Rule 404(b) where such evidence is necessary to the jury's understanding of
the offense on trial. 231 The necessity exception under Rule 404(b) applies
because in describing the primary offense, it is impractical to avoid describ-
ing the other offense. 23 2 The court said that the necessity requirement is met
"[o]nly if the facts and circumstances of the instant offense would make little
or no sense without also bringing in the same transaction contextual
evidence." 233
However, having found necessity to be a valid purpose under Rule 404(b),
the court nevertheless found that the necessity test was not met in this
case. 234 According to the court, "the State could simply have described the
220. 853 S.W.2d at 32-33.
221. Id. at 32.
222. Id. at 32-33.
223. Id. at 33-34.
224. 810 S.W.2d 372, 388 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (op. on reh'g).
225. 853 S.W.2d at 33.
226. 810 S.W.2d at 386-87.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. 816 S.W.2d at 86-87.




234. Id. at 34.
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events of appellant's arrest without mentioning that marijuana was found, in
addition to methamphetamine. The jury's understanding of the instant of-
fenses would not have been impaired or clouded had the State described
appellant's arrest without including the evidence concerning the
marijuana." 235
In a concurring opinion Judge Clinton made several pertinent observa-
tions. First, he said by " 'necessity' [it] is meant that it is impossible to pres-
ent a coherent picture of the charged offense without inadvertently proving
the 'other crime, wrong, or act.' ",236 Secondly, because of the limited reason
for the admissibility of the evidence, i.e., the impossibility of presenting a
coherent picture without it, a defendant will be entitled to a limiting
instruction. 237
The Rogers case is likely to provoke considerable litigation over what is
"necessary" in explaining the facts of a case. No doubt prosecutors will
attempt to fit virtually all crimes, wrongs, or acts committed during the
course of an arrest or offense into this cubbyhole. However, in Rogers, the
court indicated that the necessity exception is narrowly drawn and it appears
that a trial court will likely err in interpreting it too broadly.
Bolstering as an objection to evidence was essentially eliminated by the
Court of Criminal Appeals in Cohn v. State.238 In Cohn the defendant was
convicted of two charges of indecency with a child and one charge of injury
to a child. The child complainants testified that the defendant, who was
babysitting them, got drunk and sexually molested both of them. 239 Dr.
Braden Roy, a psychiatrist, testified during the State's case in chief. He said
that he had examined the children a few days after the offense. Dr. Roy
testified in general terms that sexually abused children could be expected to
experience crying episodes and angry episodes and to manifest problems
with concentration at school. He also said that they tend to hang onto their
parents and to constantly try to get reassurance.
The prosecutor next inquired as to the particular demeanor of the children
when Roy interviewed them. Cohn lodged a bolstering objection, which was
overruled. Roy then stated that the girl was mildly depressed and that her
affect was constricted, which was consistent with experiencing trauma.
When she went into the details, she was appropriate with her feelings and
was crying and nervous. He said the boy was in distress, displaying fear,
anger and helplessness.
Roy's testimony did not state directly that the children were sexually
abused or were telling the truth, therefore it was not prohibited under Duck-
ett v. State.240 However, Cohn argued that under Duckett the trial court
235. Id.
236. Id. at 36.
237. Id.
238. 849 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
239. Id. at 817.
240. 797 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Duckett held that expert testimony which
provided the jury with information concerning child sexual abuse syndrome and applied ele-
ments of the syndrome to the facts of the case was admissible as expert testimony so long as
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may not admit this kind of testimony unless the child witness has first been
impeached. 241
The court initially discussed the general admissibility of testimony such as
that presented by Roy stating that 242 Roy's testimony may have been objec-
tionable under Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence 705(C) 2 4 3 if it was meant to
suggest that evidence of anxiety behavior is enough in and of itself to indi-
cate sexual abuse.244 However, Cohn made no objection on this basis. The
court additionally stated that to the extent that Roy's testimony only pro-
vided circumstantial evidence that the children experienced some traumatic
event, and that their behavior is consistent with sexual abuse, the evidence
was relevant 245 under Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence 401246 and 402.247
However, the court stated that even with a finding that the evidence was
relevant, an analysis of whether the probative value of the evidence is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice is necessary before
the evidence is to be admitted.248
The basis for the defendant's objection to the testimony, i.e., bolstering,
was found to be an essentially non-existent objection under the Rules of
Criminal Evidence. 249 The court acknowledged that Duckett 250 may have
the testimony did not directly state that the child was sexually abused or that the child was
telling the truth. Id. at 290.
241. 849 S.W.2d at 818. Cohn apparently relied on language in Duckett which indicated
that the credibility of the child must be attacked before this type of expert testimony is admis-
sible. See Duckett, 797 S.W.2d at 917-20.
242. 849 S.W.2d at 818-19.
243. Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 705(c) states: "Admissibility of Opinion: If the
court determines that the expert does not have a sufficient basis for his opinion, the opinion is
inadmissible unless the party offering the testimony first establishes sufficient underlying facts
or data." TEX. R. CRIM. EvID. 705(c).
244. 849 S.W.2d at 819 & n.3.
245. Id. at 819.
246. Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 401 states: " 'Relevant evidence' means evidence
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determina-
tion of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." TEX.
R. CRIM. EvID. 401.
247. Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 402 states: "All relevant evidence is admissible,
except as otherwise provided by constitution, by statute, by these rules or by other rules pre-
scribed pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is inadmissible." TEX.
R. CRIM. EvID. 402.
The court noted, however, that the testimony should have been objectionable, under Rule
702 and Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568, 574-75 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (Clinton, Jr., concur-
ring), on the basis that the expert testimony was not helpful to a jury and that the jury did not
need an expert to tell them that anxiety behavior is consistent with sexual abuse. 849 S.W.2d
at 819 n.4.
Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 702 states: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may tes-
tify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." TEX. R. CRIM. Ev1D. 702.
248. 849 S.W.2d at 819; see TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 403. Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence
403 states: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,
or by considerations of undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." TEX.
R. CRIM. EvID. 403.
249. 849 S.W.2d at 819-20.
250. 797 S.W.2d at 917, 919.
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left the impression that relevant expert testimony of the type presented here
is not admissible unless it serves some rehabilitative function. 25 1 However,
the court specifically disapproved of this language in Duckett and held that
the showing of a rehabilitative function is not required to admit this
testimony.252
Bolstering occurs "when one item of evidence is improperly used by a
party to add credence or weight to some earlier unimpeached piece of evi-
dence offered by the same party. ' 253 However, the court in Cohn stated that
"evidence that corroborates another witness' story or enhances inferences to
be drawn from another source of evidence, in the sense that it has an incre-
mentally further tendency to establish a fact of consequence, should not be
considered bolstering." 254
Bolstering as an objection to evidence was found to have been essentially
eliminated under the Rules of Evidence with two exceptions. 255 Under Rule
608(a) 2 5 6 opinion or reputation evidence as to the character of a party's own
witness for truthfulness is admissible only after the witness' character for
truthfulness has already been attacked by the other party. Rule 612(c) 25 7
prevents the use of prior consistent statements of a witness for the sole pur-
pose of enhancing his credibility. Neither rule addresses the admissibility of
substantive evidence that happens to corroborate a witness. 258 The court
found that no rule in the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence mandates the
exclusion of relevant evidence simply because it corroborates the testimony
of an earlier witness. 259 In other words, testimony that is otherwise relevant
and admissible is not rendered inadmissible just because it is "bolstering."
Concurring in the court's opinion, Judge Campbell pointed out that an
objection that evidence is bolstering likely preserves nothing for review on
251. 849 S.W.2d at 819.
252. Id. at 819-21.
253. See Sledge v. State, 686 S.W.2d 127, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (citing Pless v. State,
576 S.W.2d 83, 84 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978)).
254. 849 S.W.2d at 820.
255. Id. at 820.
256. Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 608(a) states:
The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the
form of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence
may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence
of truthful character is admissible only after the character of the witness for
truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.
TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 608(a).
257. Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 612(c) states: "A prior statement of a witness which
is consistent with his testimony is inadmissible except as provided in 801(e)(1)(B)." TEX. R.
CIM. EVID. 612(c).
Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 801(e)(1)(B) states: "A statement is not hearsay if:
(1) Prior statement by witness: The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing
and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement
is (B) consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied
charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive."
TEX. R. CRiM. EVID. 801(e)(1)(B).
258. 849 S.W.2d at 820.
259. Id. at 820-21.
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appeal. 260 Under the Rules of Evidence, a party objecting to certain evi-
dence must object specifically under the rules and explain clearly to the trial
court why particular evidence is inadmissible under the rules. 26'
In a significant change in evidentiary rules on sexual offense prosecutions,
the legislature amended Article 38.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Proce-
dure. 262 The amended version of the statute reads as follows:
A conviction under Chapter 21, Section 22.011, or Section 22.021, Pe-
nal Code, is supportable on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim
of the sexual offense if the victim informed any person, other than the
defendant, of the alleged offense within one year after the date on which
the offense is alleged to have occurred. The requirement that the victim
inform another person of an alleged offense does not apply if the victim
was younger than 18 years of age at the time of the alleged offense.
Id.
The prior version of the statute required the victim to report the offense
within six months. 263 Additionally, the prior version waived the reporting
requirement only if the victim was younger than 14.264
XIV. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
In Cage v. Louisiana265 the Supreme Court previously held that a reason-
able doubt instruction which equated reasonable doubt with "grave uncer-
tainty" and "actual substantial doubt" was violative of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.266
In Sullivan v. Louisiana267 the Supreme Court took the Cage holding one
step further and held that the giving of this same deficient reasonable doubt
instruction requires reversal and is not amenable to a harmless error
analysis. 268
In Sullivan the defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sen-
tenced to death in a Louisiana state court.269 On appeal, the Louisiana
Supreme Court recognized, in conformity with Cage, that the reasonable
doubt instruction was deficient but found it to be harmless beyond a reason-
able doubt.270 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide




The Court, through Justice Scalia, cited Duncan v. Louisiana272 for the
260. Id. at 821-22.
261. Id.
262. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.07 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
263. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.07 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
264. Id.
265. 498 U.S. 39 (1990) (per curiam).
266. 498 U.S. at 41.
267. 113 S. Ct. 2078 (1993).
268. Id. at 2081-83.
269. Id. at 2080.
270. 596 So. 2d 177, 186 (La. 1992).
271. 113 S. Ct. 373 (1992).
272. 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
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proposition that because the right to a trial by jury in serious criminal cases
is "fundamental to the American scheme of justice" it therefore applies in
state prosecutions. 273 The most important element of this right is to have
the jury rather than the judge reach the requisite finding of guilty. 274 Under
the Due Process Clause, 275 the prosecution bears the burden of proving all
elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.276 Justice Scalia noted
that the Fifth Amendment requirement of proof beyond a reasonable2 77
doubt and the Sixth Amendment requirement of a jury verdict 278 are interre-
lated279 and that the jury verdict required by the Sixth Amendment is a jury
verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 280 Therefore, the deficient rea-
sonable doubt instruction violated Sullivan's Sixth Amendment right to a
jury trial. 281
Having reaffirmed the seriousness of the error in the jury instructions, the
Court next addressed whether a harmless error analysis was appropriate. 2 82
In Chapman v. California283 the Court previously rejected the view that all
federal constitutional errors in a criminal trial require reversal. 284 Under
Chapman and its progeny, two categories of constitutional error are estab-
lished. 285 The first category includes errors that may be harmless in terms of
their effect on the fact-finding process at trial. 286 The second category in-
cludes constitutional errors that will always invalidate a conviction. 287 The
Court found the error of giving the jury a constitutionally deficient reason-
able doubt instruction to be in the second category and to require reversal
without a harmless error analysis. 288
Justice Scalia explained that Chapman instructs the reviewing court not to
consider what effect the constitutional error might generally be expected to
have upon a reasonable jury, but rather what effect it had upon the guilty
verdict in the case at bar.289 According to Justice Scalia, the inquiry "is not
273. 113 S. Ct. at 2080.
274. Id.; see Sparf and Hansen v. U.S., 156 U.S. 51, 55-56 (1895).
275. "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
"... nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or Property, without due Process
of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
276. 113 S. Ct. at 2080-81.
277. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
278. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI.




283. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
284. Id. at 21.
285. Id. at 24; Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986); Arizona v. Fulminante,
111 S. Ct. 1246, 1254 (1991).
286. 386 U.S. at 24.
287. 113 S. Ct. at 2081; Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1265 (citing interalia, Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (total deprivation of the right to counsel); Tumey v. Ohio, 273
U.S. 510 (1927) (trial by a biased judge); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984) (right to
self-representation).
288. 113 S. Ct. at 2081-82.
289. Id. at 2081.
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whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would
surely have been rendered, butwhether the guilty verdict actually rendered
in this trial was surely unattributable to the error. '290 Since Sullivan did not
receive a jury verdict within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment, the entire
premise of the Chapman review is absent. Justice Scalia stated that since
there is no jury verdict of beyond a reasonable doubt there can be no inquiry
into whether the same verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt would
have been rendered absent the constitutional error.29 1 In other words, since
the basis of a harmless error analysis is to determine what effect the error
had upon the guilty verdict rendered, and in this case the error is in the
rendering of the verdict itself, there can be no harmless error analysis.
The Court also applied the test of Arizona v. Fulminante292 in further
concluding that a harmless error analysis is inappropriate. 293 Fulminante
distinguished between "structural defects in the constitution of the trial
mechanism which defy analysis by 'harmless error' standards" 294 and trial
errors which occur "during the presentation of the case to the jury, and
which may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evi-
dence presented. ' 295 Justice Scalia found the right to a jury verdict of guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt to be of the former sort.296 He stated that the
"deprivation of that right, with consequences that are necessarily unquantifi-
able and indeterminate, unquestionably qualifies as 'structural error,' ",297
and are not amenable to a harmless error analysis.
XV. PUNISHMENT
The class of defendants eligible for deferred adjudication probation was
significantly broadened by the Court of Criminal Appeals in Cabezas v.
State.298 In Cabezas a unanimous court held that there is nothing in the
statute governing deferred adjudication 299 probation which limits the eligi-
290. Id. at 2081-82.
291. Id. at 2082.
292. 111 S. Ct. at 1252, 1254 (1991).
293. 113 S. Ct. at 2083.
294. 111 S. Ct. at 1264.
295. Id. at 1265.
296. 113 S. Ct. at 2083.
297. Id.
298. 848 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
299. Article 42.12, Section 5 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, now states in part:
Deferred Adjudication; Community Supervision. (a) Except as provided by
Subsection (d) of this section, when in the judge's opinion the best interest of
society and the defendant will be served, the judge may, after receiving a plea of
guilty or plea of nolo contendere, hearing the evidence, and finding that it sub-
stantiates the defendant's guilt, defer further proceedings without entering an
adjudication of guilt, and place the defendant on community supervision. The
judge shall inform the defendant orally or in writing of the possible conse-
quences under Subsection (b) of this section of a violation of community super-
vision. If the information is provided orally, the judge must record and
maintain the judge's statement to the defendant. In a felony case, the period of
community supervision may not exceed 10 years. In a misdemeanor case, the
period of community supervision may not exceed two years. A judge may in-
crease the maximum period of community supervision in the manner provided
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bility for deferred adjudication to those cases where the minimum sentence
is ten years or less.
Cabezas plead nolo contendere to the offense of delivery of cocaine weigh-
ing at least 400 grams. Under Texas Health and Safety Code, Section
481.112(d)(3), 300 the minimum punishment for this offense was imprison-
ment for fifteen years. The trial court found the best interest of society and
Cabezas would be served by deferring Cabezas's adjudication of guilt.30 1
However, the trial court concluded that Cabezas was not eligible for de-
ferred adjudication because his minimum punishment exceeded ten years.30 2
Therefore, the court sentenced him to the statutory minimum of fifteen years
imprisonment.30 3
The Court of Criminal Appeals distinguished deferred adjudication proba-
tion under Article 42.12, Section 5, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, from
that of court-ordered probation under Article 42.12, Section 3304 and jury-
by Section 22(c) of this article. The judge may impose a fine applicable to the
offense and require any reasonable conditions of community supervision, includ-
ing mental health treatment under Section I I(d) of this article, that a judge
could impose on a defendant placed on community supervision for a conviction
that was probated and suspended, including confinement. However, upon writ-
ten motion of the defendant requesting final adjudication filed within 30 days
after entering such plea and the deferment of adjudication, the judge shall pro-
ceed to final adjudication as in all other cases.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art 42.12 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
300. Texas Health and Safety Code, Section 481.112, states in relevant part:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, a person commits an offense if the
person knowingly or intentionally manufactures, delivers, or possesses with in-
tent to manufacture or deliver a controlled substance listed in Penalty Group 1.
(c) A person commits an aggravated offense if the person commits an offense
under Subsection (a) and the amount of the controlled substance to which the
offense applies is, by aggregate weight, including adulterants and dilutants, 28
grams or more.
(d) An offense under Subsection (c) is:
('3) punishable by confinement in the Texas Department of Corrections for
life or for a term of not more than 99 years or less than 15 years, and a fine not
to exceed $250,000, if the amount of the controlled substance to which the of-
fense applies is, by aggregate weight, including adulterants or dilutants, 400
grams or more.
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.112 (Vernon 1992).
301. 848 S.W.2d at 693.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Article 42.12, Section 3, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, now states:
Judge Ordered Community Supervision.
(a) A judge, in the best interest of justice, the public, and the defendant, after
conviction or a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, may suspend the imposition of
the sentence and place the defendant on community supervision or impose a fine
applicable to the offense and place the defendant on community supervision.
(b) In a felony case the minimum period of community supervision is the
same as the minimum term of imprisonment applicable to the offense and the
maximum period of community supervision is 10 years.
(c) The maximum period of community supervision in a misdemeanor case is
two years.
(d) A judge may increase the maximum period of community supervision in
the manner provided by Section 22(c) of this article.
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ordered probation under Article 42.12, Section 4.305 A defendant is eligible
for court-ordered probation "where the maximum punishment assessed
against the defendant does not exceed 10 years imprisonment. ' 30 6 A defend-
ant is eligible for probation from a jury where the defendant has never before
been convicted of a felony in Texas or any other state and where the punish-
ment assessed by the jury does not exceed ten years.3 0 7 By contrast, the
statutory language establishing eligibility for deferred adjudication makes no
reference to any maximum sentence length.30 8 The court found this differ-
ence in the statutory language controlling and concluded that the fact that
the offense carries a statutory minimum sentence of over ten years does not
affect eligibility for deferred adjudication probation. 3°9
The court noted that it had previously held that when a defendant was not
eligible for one type of probation, that fact does not preclude his eligibility
for another type of probation.310 In West v. State311 the court held that even
though a defendant convicted of aggravated sexual assault was precluded
(e) A defendant is not eligible for community supervision under this section if
the defendant:
(1) is sentenced to a term of imprisonment that exceeds 10 years; or
(2) is sentenced to serve a term of confinement under Section 12.35, Penal
Code.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
305. 848 S.W.2d at 694. Article 42.12, Section 4 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure,
now states:
Jury Recommended Community Supervision.
(a) A jury that imposes confinement as punishment for an offense may rec-
ommend to the judge that the judge suspend the imposition of the sentence and
place the defendant on community supervision. A judge shall suspend the impo-
sition of the sentence and place the defendant on community supervision if the
jury makes that recommendation in the verdict.
(b) If the jury recommends to the judge that the judge place the defendant on
community supervision, the judge shall place the defendant on community su-
pervision for any period permitted under Section 3(b) or 3(c) of this article, as
appropriate.
(c) A judge may increase the maximum period of community supervision in
the manner provided by Section 22(c) of this article.
(d) A defendant is not eligible for community supervision under this section
if the defendant:
(1) is sentenced to a term of imprisonment that exceeds 10 years;
(2) is sentenced to serve a term of confinement under Section 12.35, Penal
Code; or
(3) does not file a sworn motion under Subsection (e) of this section or for
whom the jury does not enter in the verdict a finding that the information con-
tained in the motion is true.
(e) A defendant is eligible for community supervision under this section only
if before the trial begins the defendant files a written sworn motion with the
judge that the defendant has not previously been convicted of a felony in this or
any other state, and the jury enters in the verdict a finding that the information
in the defendant's motion is true.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
306. Id. § 3.
307. Id. § 4.
308. Id. § 5.
309. 848 S.W.2d at 694-95.
310. Id. at 694.
311. 702 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
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from regular court-ordered probation under Article 42.12, Section
3g(a)(1), 312 such preclusion did not necessarily foreclose the option of de-
ferred adjudication under Article 42.12, Section 5. 3 13 Following West, the
Cabezas court held that the statutory language controls eligibility for de-
ferred adjudication. 314 Since Cabezas was not precluded from receiving it,
he was eligible. 315
In Cabezas the State argued that public policy precluded allowing deferred
adjudication in cases where high minimum sentences were established by the
legislature. 31 6 In particular, the court recognized that a habitual offender,
indicted under Texas Penal Code, Section 12.42317 would be eligible for de-
ferred adjudication probation even though his statutory minimum sentence
was twenty-five years. 3 18 Nevertheless, the court noted that the deferred ad-
judication statute provides that deferred adjudication will only be granted
when "the best interest of society and the defendant will be served. ' '3 19 The
opinion stated, "we do not perceive of a scenario where the interests of soci-
ety will be best served by granting deferred adjudication to habitual offend-
ers. ' '320 However, if a trial court believes, for whatever reason, that the best
interest of society and the defendant would be served by granting an habitual
offender probation, he is free to do so.
312. Article 42.12, Section 3g(a)(l) and (2), now states in part:
Limitation on Judge Ordered Community Supervision. (a) The provisions of
Section 3 of this article do not apply:
(1) to a defendant adjudged guilty of an offense defined by the following sec-
tions of the Penal Code:
(A) Section 19.02 (Murder);
(B) Section 19.03 (Capital Murder);
(C) Section 21.11 (a)(1) (Indecency with a child);
(D) Section 20.04 (Aggravated kidnapping);
(E) Section 22.021 (Aggravated sexual assault);
(F) Section 29.03 (Aggravated robbery); or
(2) to a defendant when it is shown that a deadly weapon as defined in Sec-
tion 1.07, Penal Code, was used or exhibited during the commission of a felony
offense or during immediate flight therefrom, and that the defendant used or
exhibited the deadly weapon or was a party to the offense and knew that a
deadly weapon would be used or exhibited. On an affirmative finding under this
subdivision, the trial court shall enter the finding in the judgment of the court.
On an affirmative finding that the deadly weapon was a firearm, the court shall
enter that finding in its judgment.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
313. 702 S.W.2d at 634.
314. 848 S.W.2d at 694-95.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 695.
317. Texas Penal Code, Section 12.42, states in part:
(d) If it be shown on the trial of any felony offense that the defendant has previ-
ously been finally convicted of two felony offenses, and the second previous fel-
ony conviction is for an offense that occurred subsequent to the first previous
conviction having become final, on conviction he shall be punished by confine-
ment in the Texas Department of Corrections for life, or for any term of not
more than 99 years or less than 25 years.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42 (Vernon Supp. 1993).





In late 1992, the conflict between the courts of appeals over whether
unadjudicated extraneous offenses were admissible at the punishment phase
of a non-capital offense was resolved by the Court of Criminal Appeals. In
the consolidated cases of Grunsfeld v. State32t and Hunter v. State322 the
court concluded that evidence of unadjudicated extraneous offenses was not
admissible under these circumstances.3 23 However, in 1993, the Texas legis-
lature weighed in with what is likely the final word on the subject, legisla-
tively overruling Grunsfeld and establishing that evidence of unadjudicated
extraneous offenses is admissible at the punishment phase of a non-capital
trial under certain circumstances. 324
In Grunsfeld the court consolidated two courts of appeals cases requesting
review of the same issue. The courts of appeals interpreted the 1989 amend-
ment to Article 37.07(3)(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, in
different ways. The specific language at issue from the 1989 amendment
stated that evidence may be offered at punishment as to "any matter the
court deems relevant to sentencing .... ,,325 In Grunsfeld326 the Dallas
Court of Appeals held that this language did not change prior law which
prohibited the introduction of evidence of unadjudicated extraneous offenses
at the punishment phase of a non-capital trial. 327 In Hunter328 the Ft.
Worth Court of Appeals came to the opposite conclusion, ruling that the
amendment to Article 37.07(3)(a) was intended to have the same meaning
and effect as Article 37.071(2)(a) of the329 Texas Code of Criminal Proce-
dure, which has been interpreted as allowing evidence of unadjudicated ex-
traneous offenses to be presented in the punishment phase of a capital
murder prosecution. 330
The Court of Criminal Appeals overruled Hunter and affirmed Grunsfeld,
agreeing with the Dallas Court of Appeals by construing Article 37.07(3)(a)
to provide that even if deemed relevant to sentencing by the trial court, evi-
dence is not admissible at punishment unless (1) it is permitted by the Rules
of Evidence and (2) if the evidence sought to be admitted is evidence of an
extraneous offense, it satisfies Article 37.07(3)(a)'s definition of prior crimi-
nal record. 33' Since the definition of prior criminal record under Article
321. 843 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
325. 843 S.W.2d at 522.
326. Grunsfeld v. State, 813 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991).
327. 843 S.W.2d at 522.
328. Hunter v. State, No. 2-90-170-CR (Tex. App.-Ft. Worth, August 30, 1991) (unpub-
lished opinion).
329. Article 37.071(2)(a) provided in relevant part that in the punishment phase of a capi-
tal murder prosecution "evidence may be presented as to any matter the court deems relevant
to sentence." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(2)(a) (Vernon Supp. 1993). This
language has been consistently interpreted as allowing introduction of evidence of extraneous
unadjudicated offense at the punishment phase of a capital murder trial. See Gentry v. State,
770 S.W.2d 780, 793 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988); Rumbaugh v. State, 629 S.W.2d 747, 754 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1982); Garcia v. State, 581 S.W.2d 168, 178-79 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
330. 843 S.W.2d at 522.
331. Id. at 523.
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37.07(3)(a) 332 does not include unadjudicated extraneous offenses, their ad-
mission was prohibited.
Determined not to allow Grunsfeld to be the final word on the issue, the
Texas legislature in 1993 amended Article 37.07(3)(a). 333 In unambiguous
332. Article 37.07(3)(a) previously defined prior criminal record as follows: "The term
prior criminal record means a final conviction in a court of record, or a probated or suspended
sentence that has occurred prior to trial, or any final conviction material to the offense
charged." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07(3)(a) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
This language has been removed from the amended version of Article 37.07(3)(a). TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07(3)(a) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
333. Article 37.07(3)(a), now reads:
Section 3. Evidence of prior criminal record in all criminal cases after a finding
of guilty.
(a) Regardless of the plea and whether the punishment be assessed by the
judge or the jury, evidence may be offered by the state and the defendant as to
any matter the court deems relevant to sentencing, including but not limited to
the prior criminal record of the defendant, his general reputation, his character,
an opinion regarding his character, the circumstances of the offense for which he
is being tried, and, notwithstanding Rules 404 and 405, Texas Rules of Criminal
Evidence, any other evidence of an extraneous crime or bad act that is shown
beyond a reasonable doubt by evidence to have been committed by the defend-
ant or for which he could be held criminally responsible, regardless of whether
he has previously been charged with or finally convicted of the crime or act. A
court may consider as a factor in mitigating punishment the conduct of a de-
fendant while participating in a program under Chapter 17 of this code as a
condition of release on bail. Additionally, notwithstanding Rule 609(d), Texas
Rules of Criminal Evidence, evidence may be offered by the state and the de-
fendant of an adjudication of delinquency based on a violation by the defendant
of a penal law of the grade of felony unless:
(1) the adjudication is based on conduct committed more than five years
before the commission of the offense for which the person is being tried; and
(2) in the five years preceding the date of the commission of the offense for
which the person is being tried, the person did not engage in conduct for which
the person has been adjudicated as a delinquent child or a child in need of super-
vision and did not commit an offense for which the person has been convicted.
(b) After the introduction of such evidence has been concluded, and if the
jury has the responsibility of assessing the punishment, the court shall give such
additional written instructions as may be necessary and the order of procedure
and the rules governing the conduct of the trial shall be the same as are applica-
ble on the issue of guilt or innocence.
(c) In cases where the matter of punishment is referred to the jury, the ver-
dict shall not be complete until the jury has rendered a verdict both on the guilt
or innocence of the defendant and the amount of punishment, where the jury
finds the defendant guilty. In the event the jury shall fail to agree, a mistrial
shall be declared, the jury shall be discharged, and no jeopardy shall attach.
(d) When the judge assesses the punishment, he may order an investigative
report as contemplated in Section 9 of Article 42.12 of this code and after con-
sidering the report, and after the hearing of the evidence hereinabove provided
for, he shall forthwith announce his decision in open court as to the punishment
to be assessed.
(e) Nothing herein contained shall be construed as affecting the admissibility
of extraneous offenses on the question of guilt or innocence.
(f) In cases in which the matter of punishment is referred to a jury, either
party may offer into evidence the availability of community corrections facilities
serving the jurisdiction in which the offense was committed.
(g) On timely request of the defendant, notice of intent to introduce evidence
under this article shall be given in the same manner required by Rule 404(b),
Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence. If the attorney representing the state intends
to introduce an extraneous crime or bad act that has not resulted in a final
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language, the new version of the statute provides that evidence may be of-
fered at the punishment phase of a trial as to any "extraneous crime or bad
act that is shown beyond a reasonable doubt by evidence to have been com-
mitted by the defendant or for which he could be held criminally responsi-
ble, regardless of whether he has previously been charged with or finally
convicted of the crime or act."'334 Since Texas case law has consistently al-
lowed admission of evidence of unadjudicated extraneous offenses in the
punishment phase of capital murder prosecutions 335 and since the language
of the amended Article 37.07(3)(a) is clear, this type of evidence will become
common in prosecutions throughout the state.
XVI. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
Rule 30(b) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 336 lists a number of
grounds upon which a trial court may grant a new trial. In Reyes v. State337
the state argued that the list was an exclusive one. The Court of Criminal
Appeals, however, stated that the rule does not limit the grounds upon
which a new trial may be granted. 338 The list is illustrative rather than ex-
haustive.3 39 Consequently, the court held that ineffective assistance of coun-
sel may be raised in a motion for new trial. 34° The court then went on to
consider whether a trial court must hold a hearing on a motion for new trial
that is based on ineffective assistance of counsel.3 4 1 The court held that
when a defendant raises matters in a motion for new trial that are not deter-
minable from the record and upon which the defendant could be entitled to
relief, it is an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to fail to hold a hearing
on the motion.342
The non-exclusive nature of the list of grounds in Rule 30(b) upon which a
motion for new trial may be based was dramatically illustrated in State v.
Gonzales.343 In that case, the defendant asked the trial judge for a new trial
"in the interest of justice." 344 The trial judge granted the motion and the
State appealed. The State first complained about the granting of a new trial
conviction in a court of record or a probated or suspended sentence, notice of
that intent is reasonable only if the notice includes the date on which and the
county in which the alleged crime or bad act occurred and the name of the
alleged victim of the crime or bad act. The requirement under this subsection
that the attorney representing the state give notice applies only if the defendant
makes a timely request to the attorney representing the state for the notice.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
334. Id.
335. See Gentry, Rumbaugh, Garcia, supra note 330.
336. TEX. R. App. P. 30(b).
337. 849 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
338. Id. at 814.
339. Id. at 815.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 816; cf Jordan v. State, 852 S.W.2d 689, 692 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th] 1993)
(hearing not necessary on motion for new trial raising ineffective assistance of counsel because
specific allegations, even if true, would not entitle defendant to relief).
343. 855 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
344. Id. at 693.
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on a basis not identified in Rule 30(b). The Court of Criminal Appeals up-
held the trial judge's action by reiterating that the grounds identified in Rule
30(b) are not the exclusive grounds upon which a motion for new trial may
be granted. 345 The State then complained both about the failure of the new
trial motion to allege a factual basis and about the failure of the defendant to
offer proof demonstrating that the trial judge erred in accepting the defend-
ant's guilty pleas. The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed that a defendant
must allege sufficient grounds in a motion for new trial to apprise the court
and the State why he believes himself entitled to a new trial. 346 The court,
however, held that the allegation that a witness was unavailable to testify at
the defendant's trial coupled with the presentation of that witness at the
hearing on the motion for new trial is sufficient, even though it was never
specified what the witness would have testified about, because the State
failed to develop a record on that matter when given the opportunity. 347
Finally, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the granting of a motion
for new trial, just like the denial of a motion for new trial, would be judged
by the abuse of discretion standard.348
The Texas legislature amended the Code of Criminal Procedure to provide
a defendant with a right to a new trial "where material evidence favorable to
the accused has been discovered since trial."' 349 It is unclear how this statute
fits in with the provisions of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure gov-
erning motions for new trial.
The legislature also amended the Code of Criminal Procedure to allow a
defendant a new trial if requested within ten days after the entry of a judg-
ment of conviction for a Class C misdemeanor offense based on the forfeiture
of a cash bond. 350 In order to effect this right a trial court must notify a
defendant, in writing, of the entry of the judgment. 351
XVII. APPEAL
The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure require a defendant to file notice
of appeal within thirty days "after the day sentence is imposed or suspended
in open court or the day an appealable order is signed by the trial judge. '352
In Rodarte v. State353 the appellant argued that the rule is ambiguous in
cases of direct appeal from a judgment of conviction. According to the ap-
pellant, the time period for filing a notice of appeal could start from the day
sentence is imposed or suspended in open court or from the day the judg-
ment, "an appealable order," is signed. The Court of Criminal Appeals,
345. Id. at 694.
346. Id. at 694-95.
347. Id. at 695.
348. Id. at 696; accord, State v. Charlton, 847 S.W.2d 443, 444 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st]
1993).
349. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 40.001 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
350. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 45.231(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
351. Id.
352. TEX. R. App. P. 41(b)(1) (the time period is extended to ninety days if a motion for
new trial is filed).
353. 860 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
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however, did not find the rule to be ambiguous. 354 The court found the
starting point for calculating the timeliness of a notice of appeal "depends
upon what is being appealed. ' 355 When the defendant appeals from a judg-
ment of conviction, the starting point for determining when a notice of ap-
peal should be filed is the day sentence is imposed or suspended in open
court.356 In other appeals, such as from the denial on the merits of an appli-
cation for writ of habeas corpus or when the State appeals, the timetable
begins on the day of the signing of an appealable order. 357 Appellant's no-
tice of appeal came thirty-one days after the day sentence was imposed in
open court and was thus untimely.3
58
An appellant is entitled to a new trial if he makes a timely request for a
statement of facts and the statement of facts cannot be prepared because the
court reporter's notes and records have been lost or destroyed without appel-
lant's fault. 359 A request is "timely" if it is made in writing to the court
reporter at or before the time prescribed for perfecting the appeal. 36° In
addition, an appellant must show due diligence in attempting to obtain a
complete statement of facts before a new trial will be ordered because of a
missing statement of facts. 361 A request to one court reporter for a state-
ment of facts does not constitute a request to another court reporter who
may have reported another part of the proceedings. 362 Doing nothing once
the appellant learns that a second court reporter reported part of the pro-
ceedings does not constitute due diligence.363 In such a circumstance, the
appellant is not entitled to a new trial. 364
In Olowosuko v. State365 the Court of Criminal Appeals reiterated that no
appeal may be taken from a determination to proceed with an adjudication
of guilt.366 An appeal, however, may be taken from all proceedings after the
adjudication of guilt. 367
In Matin v. State 368 the Court of Criminal Appeals divided the various
rules governing the Texas criminal justice system into three kinds: "(1) ab-
solute requirements and prohibitions; (2) rights of litigants which must be
implemented by the system unless expressly waived; and (3) rights of liti-
gants which are to be implemented upon request."' 369 The first two catego-
354. Id. at 109.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 110.
358. Id.
359. TEX. R. App. P. 50(e).
360. TEX. R. App. P. 53(a).
361. Culton v. State, 852 S.W.2d 512, 514 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
362. Id. at 515.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. 826 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
366. Id. at 942; see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12 § 5(b) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
367. Id.
368. 851 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
369. Id. at 279 (For example, an absolute requirement of the system is that a felony offense
may not be tried in a County Court at Law even by consent. A waivable requirement is the
right to a jury trial. Most evidentiary rules fall into the third category).
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ries of rules cannot be the subject of procedural default on appeal because,
by definition, they are not forfeitable by the mere failure to assert them. 370
The third category, however, is forfeited on appeal by the failure of the liti-
gant to assert his right in the trial court.37' Accordingly, the court held that
Rule 52(a) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure applies only to the actions of
the trial judge concerning matters about which a party forfeits the right to
complain on appeal if he does not object to the denial of his right at trial.372
Main was therefore not required to object in the trial court to the failure to
allow appointed counsel ten days to prepare for trial because that right must
be expressly waived. 373 The trial court's error in putting Marin to trial with-
out first allowing his appointed counsel ten days to prepare is not subject to a
harmless error analysis because the record is not likely to provide concrete
data from which an appellate court can measure the error. 374
Most lawyers have grown up with the belief that it is impossible to reverse
a bench trial on appeal because of erroneous evidentiary rulings. This belief
prevailed because appellate courts presumed that improperly admitted evi-
dence was disregarded by the trial court.375 The Court of Criminal Appeals,
in a decision that could have far reaching implications, overturned that pre-
sumption in Gipson v. State.376 The trial court in Gipson erroneously admit-
ted a confession into evidence. The trial judge specifically stated that she
relied, in part, on the confession in finding the defendant guilty. The Court
of Criminal Appeals held that the promulgation of Rule 81(b)(2) of the
Rules of Appellate Procedure voided the presumption that a trial judge dis-
regards improperly admitted evidence. 377 Thus, since the judge did rely on
the confession in reaching her judgment, the Court of Criminal Appeals
could not determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no con-
tribution to the conviction. 378 The conviction was therefore reversed. 379
In Bigley v. State 3 8 0 the appellant was convicted by a jury of the offense of
possession of 400 grams or more of methamphetamine. The court of appeals
found the evidence insufficient to support that conviction. The court of ap-
peals, however, found sufficient evidence to support a conviction of posses-
370. Id.
371. Id. at 280.
372. Id. A party must present a timely request, complaint, or motion to the trial court to
preserve a complaint for appellate review. TEX. R. App. P. 52(a).
373. 851 S.W.2d at 280. Appointed counsel has ten days to prepare for a proceeding unless
the time is waived with the consent of the defendant. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
1.051(e) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
374. 851 S.W.2d at 282; see also Meek v. State, supra refusing to apply a harmless error
analysis to the failure of a defendant to execute a written jury waiver.
375. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 478 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
376. 844 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
377. Id. at 741; Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 81(B)(2) states: "Reversible Error.
Criminal Cases. If the appellate record in a criminal case reveals error in the proceedings
below, the appellate court shall reverse the judgment under review, unless the appellate court
determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the conviction or
to the punishment." TEX. R. App. P. 81(B)(2).
378. 844 S.W.2d at 741.
379. Id.
380. No. 939-92 (Tex. Crim. App. June 16, 1993).
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sion of methamphetamine in an amount of twenty-eight grams or more but
less than 400 grams. Because the jury had been instructed on the lesser in-
cluded offense, the court of appeals reformed the judgment to reflect a con-
viction of the lesser offense and then remanded for a new punishment
hearing. The Court of Criminal Appeals interpreted Rule 80 of the Texas
Rules of Appellate Procedure to authorize this procedure.38' The Court of
Criminal Appeals therefore affirmed the court of appeals. 382
381. Id. slip op. at 2-3; Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 80(b), reads in pertinent part as
follows: "The court of appeals may: . . . (2) modify the judgment of the court below by cor-
recting or reforming it .... " TEX. R. App. P. 80(b).
382. The Court of Criminal Appeals also held that it did not have the authority to reform a
judgment in such a manner. No. 939-92, slip op. at 2-3.
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